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with most of his conclusions, I enjoyed the intellectual exclIange. And this itself is a cbaIlenge for 
theology: to deal with the thought of others always with respect, even if not always with agreement 
-FIdber RusIeI E. Smith, S.TD. 
Director of Eth!('1ltinn 
PopeJobnXXID Mediad-MonI 
Research IUd M....tinn Ceoter 
Boston 
Moral Absolutes, Tradition, 
Revision, and Truth 
by John Finnis 
The Catholic University of AmJ!rica Press, 1991, 113 pages. 
This densely packed short work, representing the four MicbaeIJ. McGivney Lectures delivered at 
the Pontifical John Paul n Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family in September 1988, does 
essentially three things: 1) it clarifies the traditional meaning of "moral absolute" and distinguishes it 
from recent counterfeits; 2) it points out the centra1ity of moral absolutes in the Catholic-Cbristian 
tradition from its beginnings to the present day; and 3) it gives a strictly philosophical defence of the 
moral truth of these exceptionless moral norms against coosequentia1ist moral theories in both their 
secular and religious guises. 
1. The Meaning of "MonI Absolute" 
Debate and doubt about the existence and nature of absolute moral norms arose within the 
Catholic community especially in the area of sexual morality but has spread from there to include 
practically every other moral issue. Throughout the debate, the Church, to the consternation of 
many, has continued to assert the truth of such absolutes, as is evidenced from the following 
quotation from John Paul II's Address to Moral Theologians of November 12,1988: 
By describing the contraceptive act as intrinsically illicit, Paul VI meant to teach that the 
moral norm is such that it does not admit exceptions. No personal or social circumstance 
could ever, can now, or will ever, render such an act lawful in itself. The existence of 
particular norms regarding man's way of acting in the world, which are endowed with a 
binding force that excludes always and in whatever situation the possibility of exceptions, 
is a constant teaching of Tradition and of the Church's Magisterium, which cannot be 
called in question by the Catholic theologian.l 
Besides contraception one could list divorce, adultery, abortion, suicide, fornication, homosexual 
sex, masturbation, lying, blasphemy, murder, genocide, indiscriminate bombing of civilian 
populations, artificial insemination and the generation of babies outside the marital embrace as types 
of acts judged to be intrinsically illicit at one time or another by the Church's Magisterium. 
All of these norms pick out types of actions or possible objects of choice that can be described in a 
morally neutral way. They then exclude choices of such acts from the moral agent's debberation and 
action. The acts pointed to and proscnbed by such moral absolutes are said to be intrinsically wrong. 
This means that they are always wrong, no matter what the circumstances and the motives. It does 
not mean that they are by definition wrong. Some people think that when Aristotle asserts that "one 
must always be wrong" or that "it is not possible .. . ever to be right" to commit adultery, murder or 
theft, 2 or when the Decalogue commands ''Thou shalt not kill or commit adultery or steal", that the 
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wrongness of these ads is built into their very meaning. Acoording to that view, to say that murder, 
for example, is always wrong is as trivially true as to say that a triangle is a three-sided figure. If 
"murder" by definition meaDS "wrongful or unjust killing" (or, as some moral theologians would 
have it, "killing without proportionate reason") then the norm that murder is wrong reduces to the 
pitiable tautology that wrongful killing is always wrongl However, murder bas not been definied in 
this way.lCbas been defined as the killing of the innocent In the same way, adultery bas been defined 
simply as "sex by a married person outside marriage" and was "not specifkd as wrongful or 
inordinate or uncbaste sex by a married person outside marriage - as sex without proportionate 
reason" (Finnis, p. 11). Exceptions to these norms are logically posSIble but morally excluded. 
The universality of such moral norms should also be distinguished from the universality implicit in 
judgements of conscience that take into account "all the circumstances " As a matter of logic, if it is 
right to do something under one set of circumstances, then it is always right to do that same 
something in other relevantly simiIar circumstances. This is true whatever that something may be. 
Logical consistency is a necessary pre-requisite of any coherent discourse, including moral discourse, 
but it abstracts from particular moral truths. 
Finally, the relevant exceptiooless moral norms must be distinguished from those norms, also 
exceptiooless, which forbid acts whose description is such that the norms do not apply whenever 
morally significant circumstances not mentioned in the norms occur. An example might be: It is 
always wrong to kill someone to make money. Such a norm will not apply if circumstances are such 
that killing someone to make money bad some further good consequences (let's say where the money 
could be used to build hospitals that will save the lives of thousands of people who would otherwise 
die). 
Traditional norms pointed to types of acts that were universally (not just "virtually" or 
"practically" always) proscnbed. When Pope John Paul n says that "No personal or socia1 
circumstances could ever, can now, or will ever, render such an act [as contraception ] lawful in itself" 
he is saying not merely that we can't imagine or conceive such circumstances, but that the norms 
exclude "the posSIbility of exceptions." Exceptions themselves are imposSIble, not merely their 
subjective conceivability. 
The opponents of such norms call them "material" or "physical" or "behavioural" absolutes. But 
they are properly called "moral absolutes" or "specific moral absolutes", since the acts picked out by 
moral absolutes are not defined in terms of behavior but "in terms of the acting person's object: what 
that person chooses" (p. 38). The same physical behavior and causality can embody quite different 
human ads (v.g. administering morphine may embody an intent to kill or an intent to alleviate pain) 
and different physical behaviours and causalities can embody the same human act (v.g. one may 
execute one's intent to kill someone by shooting him or by not supplying food). For purposes of 
moral evaluation one must look not to physical behaviour and causality but "to the proposal, 
combining envisaged end and selected means, which the acting person adopts (or may adopt) by 
choice, the proposal which any relevant behaviour will express and carry out" (p. 40). 
2. Moral Absolutes in auwaian Tradition 
Finnis briefly traces the history of these norms through the Old Testament (the Decalogue), the 
New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, the Middle Ages, and the teachings of Paul VI and John Paul 
n. This tradition attests to the Church's belief that the precepts of the second table of the Decalogue 
are implications of the supreme principle of love of God and neighbour. They exclude options 
inconsistent with love of self and neighbour. There is no question here of honoring rules above 
values, since by adhering to the rules one respects the good of persons protected by them. 
Finnis refutes the arguments of those who would dispute the existence of moral absolutes or the 
authority of the Church to propose them infa1hbly. Many of these objections are due to a failure to 
distinguish between what is chosen as end and means and what is voluntarily accepted as a side effect, 
or to appreciate the moral significance of this distinction (pp. 70-74; 78-83). Others are due to a 
failure to distinguish between affirmative moral norms which hold generally for the most part and 
negative moral norms which hold always and everywhere without exception (See p. 90). Some 
opponents of absolute moral norms take comfort in Aquinas's treatment of divine dispensations frOQl 
the precepts of the Decalogue. Finnis robs them of this comfort (p. 91). 
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3. PbiIosopbicaI Defence of Moral AbeoIutes 
This short work contains a mere outline of the moral theory that Finnis bas developed at greater 
length in Natural Law and Natural Righls and Fundamentals of Ethics. Finnis argues that Catholic 
proportionalists, while seeking to enlarge the moral focus by taking into account the concrete 
situation, including circumstances and motives, inevitably narrow that focus just in order to make 
proportionalist calculation and assessment even seem possible (pp. 16-20). In reality, "human reason 
cannot possibly make a comparative assessment of ... all [the] different types and possible 
instantiations of goods and bads, so as to arrive at a conclusion. . . [identifying] one of these options 
as promising overall greater net good, or net lesser evil, than its alternative (p. 22). Since reason 
cannot solve the question, one goes with one's feelings. This means that proportiona1ist reasoning is 
mere rationalization of a judgement already taken on other grounds or no grounds at all. It is reason 
at the service of desire. 
I would like to end this review by pointing out a few difficulties in Finnis's account that, I think, 
need to be addressed. On pp. 68-69 Finnis gives good advice about how to give non-arbitrary and 
morally relevant descriptions of one's acts, more specificially of what one is doing as a means towards 
some end or other. Finnis recognizes that one's description of what one is doing is as much subject to 
mistakes and rationalization as is one's calculation and assessment of the consequences of what one is 
doing. I am reminded of the newspaper cartoon depicting a man pointing a gun at a bank teller. The 
man is obviously threatening the teller's life should she refuse to band over money. But the caption 
bas the bankrobber say: 
"I am instituting my own economic self-recovery program"! 
This is a clear enough example of eliding the means into a good end, a frequent strategy of 
rationalization. What about the proper description of what is going on when the state executes a duly 
convicted murderer? Is capital punishment, as Germain Grisez thinks, a case of intentionally killing a 
person as a means towards the common good of justice, or, is it, as Finnis thinks (clearly in 
Fundamentals in Ethics, less clearly in the book under review) an instantiation of the good of justice 
with the death of the criminal an unintended side effect? Here, it might appear to some that Finnis's 
apparent desire to uphold the moral rightness of capital punishment may be influencing his 
description of an act. It seems clear to me that capital punishment involves the intended death of the 
criminal for whatever reason -retnbution or deterrence. Perhaps Finnis would reply that death 
need not be any more intended here than it need be by someone who makes use of death-dealing 
measures in an attempt to save his life from another person's assault Some would consider (wrongly, 
I believe) the refusal to admit that self-defensive killing is necessarily intentional a bit of 
rationalization just by itself. For these people, no doubt, the refusal to admit that capital punishment 
is anything but intentional killing will seem most implausible. I wonder if Finnis thinks there is any 
way of settling these disputes. 
I believe that more work needs to be done as well on what Finnis et al call reflexive goods, that is, 
the various kinds of intra- and inter-personal harmonies such as inner peace and friendship and 
religion. Finnis thinks that "not all instantiations of these reflexive goods are morally good" (pp. 
4243). For example, a choice that is in harmony with hostile feelings such as anger and hatred 
towards others is morally wrong. This seems to imply that a morally bad choice in harmony with 
feelings of anger and hatred can be a legitimate instantiation of the human good of inner peace. On 
the other band, on p. 44 Finnis says that such a harmony is a "counterfeit of the basic good of inner 
peace. . . because reason is being brought into line with feelings rather than feelings into harmony 
with reason and with the intelligible goods which give reasOn its cOntent" This would seem to imply 
that only those instantiations of reflexive goods that include morally good choices are instantiations 
of real human goods. And, indeed, it is difficult to see how a reflexive good (which is not, to be sure, 
identical with choice, since it is a harmonious whole of choice and desire) could be a genuine human 
good, a reason for choosing, unless the choice it contained was morally good. There is a confusion 
here, I believe, that needs to be cleared up. 
If Finnis et al are right about the existence and nature of moral absolutes, and I think they are, it 
becomes clear that moral casuistry becomes narrower in scope. There are some things not up for 
grabs! (See pp. 20-24) Some acts are absolutely excluded. Basic human goods are protected from 
intentional assault. At the same time, we are in some sense responsible for the foreseen, if 
unintentional, evil side effect of our actions. We cannot be indifferent to that evil. We should not 
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consider ourselves off the moral hook just because the evil is a side effect and not something directly 
intended. And so great weight falls on the moral principles, such as the Golden Rule, which measure 
our moral responsibility for the distnbution of the benefits and burdens which accompany everything 
we do. Finnis briefly touches on this in a section of Chapter 3 that has to do with one's responsibility 
for the side effects of one's actions, He admits. thaUQ apply $e Golden Rule "one must be able to 
commensurate burdens and benefits as they affect oneself, in order to know what one considers too 
great an evil to accept" (pp. 81-82). He adds immediately that the role of commensuration in 
question here is quite unlike its function within a proportionalist analysis. In this, he echoes official 
Catholic teaching on, v.g., euthanasia, which, on the one hand, rules out as always wrong the 
intentional killing of the sick and dying, but, on the other hand, does not insist on the use or continued 
use of treatments that carry "disproportionate burdens." Still, one would like to hear more about 
how this limited commensuration is to be done. Is this something ultimately beyond rational analysis 
and left to the "discernment" or "intuition" of people who, one at the very least hopes, are devoid of 
any intent to prevent, damage or destroy basic human goods? 
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Food/or the Journey, 
Theological Foundations 0/ the 
Catholic Health Care Ministry 
by Juliana Casey, IBM 
SL Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1991. pp. ix + 121. 
The Catholic Health Care ministry in the United States is in some difficulty due to financial 
pressures, staff, and competition within the industry. It is in an identity crisis, articulated by Cardinal 
Bernardin as moving toward a mixed model of identity, increasingly dependent on those who are not 
Catholic. (Origens, May 23, 1991, p 33). Those staffing these institutions once came primarily from 
religious communities, groups which clearly have not been immune to the dearth of religious 
vocations. The questions arise from the Catholic Health Care ministry: How do we survive? Do we 
survive with a Catholic identity? What are the reasons for which we exist? What are the resources we 
receive from the Catholic traditions to aid our survival? 
Sr. Juliana Casey's small book looks to rally the troops to maintain a Catholic identity in the 
institutions and the health care itself. She is less interested in the nitty gritty of administering and 
financing these entities than in inspiring the health care givers to look beyond the pain, stress and 
difficulties of their work to see the holiness of their work. While many find this support in the 
wonders their work achieves or in the appreciation of those helped, "for those who serve in Catholic 
health care, there is still another source of nourishment: the riches of Catholic theology" (p. 1). This 
gentle journey through some basic themes of Catholic theology is directed to those working in and 
administering the Catholic health care institutions. Not a scholarly book, it remains 
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